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The strong urban growth of cities in western Europe between approximately 1000 and 1300 C.E. 
resulted from important migrations. These were movements primarily from the countryside into 
nearby new population concentrations, but probably also from regions further away. Historians 
have paid little attention to the process of social integration which must have taken place in these 
rapidly growing urban communities. However, the lifestyle experienced by those in small rural 
communities, where various types of domain laws bonded serfs, differed fundamentally from that 
in the new havens of freedom. The character of urban economic activity made people less 
dependent on natural conditions and more on social constraints, as will be explored below. People 
coming from various backgrounds had to adapt to new types of work and community life. 
Habitation was more dense, the size of the community larger and levels of social interaction much 
higher although less personal. Social positions and relations were rather fluid; new roles and 
behavioural standards had to be developed. Given the variety of social origins of the new town 
dwellers, and the rapid changes consequent upon the continuing expansion, the early cities must 
have been melting pots in which the limits of the newly acquired freedom were probed through 
processes of adaptation and conflict. New social structures emerged with new laws, new 
institutions and a new sense of community. As historians, we are best informed about the steps by 
which new relations became formalized. I would like to draw attention to the phase before 
institutionalization and legislation, during which more informal social structures must have 
prepared the paths towards new urban ways of life. In the very first stage, ‘a particularized trust in 
persons of known attributes or affiliations’ needed to be created, before the urban elites and the 
community as a whole could expect to be acknowledged by a form of generalized trust attributed 
to strangers with whom transactions were to be made.1 
In this article, I hope to show how trust networks emerged and became established in the 
cities of Europe between about 1000 and 1550 C.E. In my view, community building in the first 
stage of urban growth rested essentially on personal ties, formalized by oaths of loyalty. These 
were at the heart of the sense of belonging expressed in the first communes, the groupings which 
fought for their independence vis-à-vis the established feudal and ecclesiastical powers. As 
European cities grew, these networks needed to organize themselves as public institutions, which 
allegedly changed their character fundamentally. This transition process from personal ties to 
institution building deserves special attention as this was the time when new, unprecedented 
forms of social organization came into being. Particularized trust in people had to be transferred to 
institutions which initially were characterized by closure, admitting members only after co-
optation procedures. In that stage, trust was differential. Only later, the uniform trust in 
institutions determined the rise of urban ways of life, capitalism and Western concepts of human 
rights. Therefore, it was required ‘that one’s transactions with strangers would be mediated by an 
impartial institutional framework that enforced property rights and legal contracts regardless of 
attributes of the contracting parties’.  
Instead of taking an approach that focuses on concepts such as judicial categories, social 
class and market structures, I put forward the idea that trust networks can provide a better 
understanding of the emergence and further development of these European urban communities.2 
At the same time, I will examine the limits of the efficiency of personal trust networks, with regard 
to the scale of the organizations they were supposed to run, and the internal conflicts of interest 
which arose within and between cities, and between cities and states. The most general and 
effective form of trust network is kinship, which typically bound members of aristocracies, and 
 which surely also played a major role in the formation of urban elites. Property rights, transferred 
through inheritance and marriage, underpinned the dominance of kinship.3 Within the Catholic 
Church, networks based on belief, lifestyle and education evidently functioned, within a relatively 
wealthy elite, on a very wide geographical scale. These networks were partly urban (dioceses, 
parishes and, from the thirteenth century onwards, the mendicant orders), but largely rural as they 
related to the traditional monastic orders. Trust networks were also present within aristocracies, in 
the form of kinship groups sharing a common chivalric lifestyle and of feudal bonds organizing 
groups of loyal armed followers. I will argue that the emerging cities of Europe were home to 
several new forms of trust networks which strengthened the social cohesion within as well as 
between these urban communities. However, in the thirteenth century, when the cities reached 
their medieval peak in population,4 their sheer size and internal conflicts required institutions for 
which trust was no longer the self-evident basis of operation. 
 
 
I will now discuss the types of trust networks which came into being successively within and 
between urban communities. They have been described by historians as distinct features, with 
various names in different cities, but the similarity of their internal structures and functional bases 
has not been drawn out. A first type of network that comes to mind is that of travelling merchants 
seeking protection within horizontal associations such as guilds and hanses. From the eleventh 
century onwards, when the cities were in their phase of rapid growth, these associations offered 
many opportunities to people from all sorts of social backgrounds. Inclusion and social mobility 
were vital factors which promoted urban expansion. The administration of the cities was firmly in 
the hands of the local hanses, membership of which was a prerequisite for holding public office as 
an alderman in Bruges and Leuven. Merchants’ family clans and associations will be considered 
here as the second type of trust network – historians have described them mostly as patrician. 
However, a third type emerged when artisans began to organize themselves in confraternities and 
craft guilds and challenged the merchants’ monopoly on economic, judicial and political power. 
 Religious confraternities continued to be created for purely devotional purposes, even if 
linkage with a particular church restricted them to a specific basis in a parish or quarter. In Italy, 
extensive trust networks of another type came into being as capital was accumulated on an ever 
growing scale. In north-western Europe, they first appeared from the thirteenth century onwards 
as families of ‘Lombards’ active in money-lending and other financial services. Joint-stock 
companies, with agents in nodal cities from Palestine, Egypt and the Black Sea to the North Sea, 
emerged in the fourteenth century. In regions where the landed aristocracy were resident in the 
cities, they introduced their organizational pattern based on kinship and clienteles, which in the 
urban setting created yet another type of trust network, that of the parties or even gangs struggling 
for local power. 
 At the same time, a different process led to the formation of consolidated states. Their 
traditional elites, belonging to the church and the aristocracy, merged into the new officialdom. In 
their midst developed a further type of trust network that overarched the older ones and grew 
steadily. Such networks were often formed in universities by students of specific nationalities. By 
this time, the older networks had already become exclusive and largely ceremonial. They were 
located mainly in cities, but the mobile networks of servants of the state no longer primarily served 
the interests of any particular city, although they may have mediated between cities and states. In 
the next section of this article, I will focus on the most urbanized regions in Europe from the 
eleventh to the early sixteenth century, concentrating initially on the southern Low Countries, one 
of the earliest to witness urbanization, but for which the available information is not easily 
accessible. 
The successive types of trust networks emerged as and when they were needed, depending 
on the social and economic functions that individual cities fulfilled in their regions. I hope to 
clarify the ways in which the incipient urban communities succeeded in creating, almost from 
scratch, entirely new forms of social attitudes and relations. This question has not been adequately 
dealt with, even though its relevance is clearly apparent. Indeed, it is too easily taken for granted 
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 that emerging urban communities displayed a spirit of solidarity and held common values from 
the very outset. Not only does this seem highly unlikely in view of the rapid migrations that 
occurred and the frequent use of violence reported in the early cities, but successive versions of 
urban privileges clearly demonstrate the urgency of the need to impose new norms. These 
generally aimed at the internal pacification of the urban community and the external protection of 
its members. The norms changed incrementally as they emerged over the centuries, under the 
influence of measures taken to address urgent practical problems. There were no historical models 
or theoretical blueprints to fall back on in dealing with the challenges which these growing urban 
communities had to face in western Europe from the eleventh century onwards. Consequently, the 
outcomes of this incremental process varied greatly from one place to another. The formation of 
largely autonomous urban communities was a relatively new phenomenon in world history. The 
level of urban autonomy and self-governance, combined with the protection of the rights of 
individual citizens and their property, are generally seen as the key elements which drove 
economic growth and particularly the development of commercial capitalism. This approach 
ultimately goes back to Max Weber’s fundamental reflections about the specificity of the Western 
city.5 This is what distinguishes the urbanization process in medieval Europe from anything which 
had gone before, and sets it apart from the earlier developing cities of Asia. 
 What did it mean in the first stage of urban growth for a landless labourer or serf to run 
away, trying to escape the limitations on his personal freedom but at the same time giving up the 
protection which his lord had provided for him within a domain structure? The earliest urban 
charters of liberty dealt with this matter. The oldest in the Low Countries is that of the town of Huy 
on the river Meuse, dating from 1066. Several articles deal with the position of serfs who had fled 
their domain to go to work in the towns. If the lord of the domain came to demand his return and 
was able to prove his case, he could require the serf to continue performing his traditional duties 
for him.6 This situation may have prevailed for some time in predominantly rural areas, but larger 
urban communities soon bought off the rights by which the landlords still limited their personal 
freedom. This was already the case before 1100 in places where the local lord was a bishop or an 
abbot, as in Cambrai, Utrecht, Tournai and Nivelles. In the eleven-tens, the larger cities of Arras 
(1111), Ypres and Douai followed suit. In 1067, the count of Flanders wanted to attract inhabitants 
to his newly founded town of Geraardsbergen, strategically located on a hill on the border with the 
duchy of Brabant. He did this by promising independent jurisdiction to the aldermen. Freedom 
from judicial interference by landlords meant a solid guarantee for the inhabitants of new towns, 
which would probably have been preferable to protection from their landlord. A further step was to 
ensure the legislative authority of these aldermen. The oldest documented right to create new 
urban law was granted to the small town of Aire-sur-la-Lys between 1093 and 1111. In 1127, the 
larger cities of Bruges and Saint Omer made clear that their support for a candidate count would 
depend on his recognizing their right to modify their local customary laws in accordance with their 
needs. However, all this did not yet imply that all inhabitants of these cities would be considered as 
free men. Louis VI (1098–1137) of France first orally granted personal freedom to citizens if they 
had been residents in a city for at least a year and a day, a right that was acknowledged by his 
successors. In England, the oldest mention of such a right was in 1155, while in the Low Countries 
it first appeared in the foundation charter of the harbour town Nieuwpoort, dating from 1163. As in 
Geraardsbergen, a century earlier, rulers granted new privileges in the hope of seeing their own 
foundations grow.7 
 The unity of jurisdiction and legislation, and later the equality of personal freedom, must 
have resulted in some degree of homogeneity, social cohesion and law and order within the cities, 
where masses of disgruntled migrants came together. Moreover, the urban liberties created 
relatively small, isolated areas within a wider rural world still firmly dominated by feudal powers. 
Looking at the content of the oldest urban charters, the most general concern was that of the 
preservation of peace by sound jurisdiction, if necessary against everybody, including the count 
himself. The citizens saw themselves as being united in defence against a world where violence was 
omnipresent. In the charter for Saint Omer, dated 1127, the newly inaugurated count even 
recognized the sworn commune of the city, which had formed the core of the movement against all 
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 kinds of feudal restrictions. Citizenship was thus acquired on the condition of swearing an oath of 
loyalty to the community, which implied the observance of rules.  
The aldermen strove to limit violence within the city walls by ruling against fighting and 
feuding, and by imposing restrictions on foreigners, who had to leave their arms at the city gate. 
The secularization of law was a primary concern of merchants. In 1114, the ‘sworn commune’ of the 
commercial city of Valenciennes accepted the testimonies of two ‘men of the peace’ as sufficient 
evidence in legal cases, so long as those testimonies coincided. Only when these were not available 
were traditional proofs such as immersion in cold water employed. In 1116, the burghers of Ypres 
were granted the abolition of the judicial duel within their walls. In 1127 and 1128, Saint Omer was 
granted the privilege to refuse judicial dues during the fairs of Flanders, a privilege extended in 
1173 to all Flemish merchants in Germany. Not later than 1164, testimony under oath by two 
members of the commune was granted as evidence in all matters in Arras and Saint Omer.8 
Criminal justice grew increasingly detailed and was aimed at controlling private violence through 
the prescription of peace-making procedures. Breaking a sworn peace was heavily fined.9 The 
years of urban revolt against Count William of Normandy in 1127 and 1128 provided great 
opportunities for the enlargement of urban privileges. At the same time, events reported by a 
number of chroniclers, especially Galbert of Bruges, show that varied social backgrounds underlay 
strong antagonisms. These led to serious fights within the cities as well as in the countryside, since 
various clans held different views concerning their legal and social position, particularly with 
regard to serfdom. 
Before cities had written charters, the core of cohesion among citizens was laid down at the 
level of the social elite, which consisted mainly of merchants. Their wheeling and dealing required 
various forms of organization to protect their vital interests in a world which was still dominated 
by feudal powers. The oldest documents informing us about the self-organization of travelling 
merchants designate their associations using terms such as amicitia, friendship, guild and hanse. 
The merchants of Valenciennes on the River Scheldt established a caritet: a charity or 
confraternity. In their statute, dated between 1050 and 1070, love of God, the observance of 
common religious services and solidarity among all brethren formed the basis of this group. The 
confraternity arranged funeral and memorial ceremonies for deceased brethren, and the 
membership fee was used in charitable works for mutual support as well as for other inhabitants. 
Banquets and drinking parties, libations, were held to foster a sense of community. All of these 
niceties were inspired by the material need for this solidarity group: members had to travel safely 
to markets, and being armed and in a group was an effective way to protect and support each 
other. Conflicts between members had to be mediated by the others in the confraternity.  
Similar statutes have been preserved from the merchants’ guilds of Saint Omer and Arras, 
both situated in the county of Flanders, dating from 1072 and 1083 respectively. They are more 
explicit about the settlement of conflicts arising after too much drink. The deans of these 
associations not only dealt with warranties for the members; they were even granted jurisdiction 
over the citizens. The gradual transition from private associations to public authorities is apparent 
in the charter for the amicitia of Aire-sur-la-Lys, dated before 1111. Twelve judges from their midst 
ruled over the town, applying laws which they were entitled to amend themselves. The 1127 charter 
for the city of Saint Omer extended certain privileges exclusively to the members of the merchants’ 
guild. It granted them the freedom not to pay tolls, and the revenue from the local mint was 
assigned to the maintenance of the guild.  
One can thus conclude that in the eleventh century civilized behaviour needed to be 
rigorously imposed upon the merchant elite through compulsory adherence to an association. 
They performed charitable works, presided over religious ceremonies and convivial meetings, and 
mediated conflicts between members. This socialization created the solidarity needed to protect 
trade beyond the city walls. In the course of the twelfth century, merchants took the lead in 
forming what would become the public authority in the cities, and restricted certain material and 
judicial privileges to themselves. Their associations clearly functioned as trust networks, essential 
for the organization of the urban communities and for trade between cities. The events of 1127 and 
 4 
 1128 show, however, that the merchants’ position was still heavily challenged by segments of the 
aristocracy, including the count. 
 Which new judicial regulations needed to be developed to enable the economic activities 
which would bring about ongoing and self-sustained urban growth? Apart from showing a concern 
about peace and justice, urban charters abounded with advantages granted to the citizens of a 
particular city, such as freedom from paying tolls or taxes. Litigation concerning commercial 
affairs was only possible before the local aldermen, who where the experienced specialists in these 
matters. Their jurisdiction needed to be fast and efficient, so they introduced evidence only on the 
basis of sound testimony by trustworthy fellow citizens. In the 1127 charter for Saint Omer, we 
come across the concept of trust among some citizens who needed a quick settlement of disputes in 
relation to their trade, especially in cases of debt. The sworn commune thus formed the basis of a 
trust network, whose members were exclusively eligible for public office in the city. Their relations 
facilitated commercial transactions, and gradually their network extended to the government of 
the cities. The sometimes ferocious resistance by the feudal powers against the emerging 
communes helped to foster their cohesion, based on oaths of allegiance and reliability; the external 
threats strengthened the internal solidarity. 
As soon as urban magistrates had seen their autonomy and legislative powers recognized, 
including their exclusive judicial competence over the burgesses, they strove to support the 
economic interests of their core group, that of the associated merchants and entrepreneurs. 
Personal freedom, the guarantee of property rights and secular jurisdiction by one’s peers were at 
the centre of this endeavour. A case in point is the abolition of trial by ordeal, as first documented 
in the charter for Ypres in 1116. Further steps were the restrictions on the use of private violence 
and the protection of private property against confiscation. Mediation by experts came to replace 
the reliance on irrational factors for the settlement of conflicts. Urban charters steadily began to 
contain exemptions, extended to entire territories, from tributes, tolls and other taxes charged on 
trade. Standardization of the quality of products, measures, weights and currency was also a major 
concern. 
The physical protection of travelling merchants and their goods which had first been 
organized by their private associations was now taken over by the cities’ public authorities. They 
concluded treaties with foreign rulers in order to ensure the security and trading facilities of their 
citizens abroad. This implied that urban magistrates could also undertake diplomatic action in 
cases of a violation of their citizens’ rights. If disputes could not be settled by negotiation, urban 
magistrates would decree retaliation against the subjects of the foreign authority, as a way of 
pressuring them into being more lenient. The arrest of merchants and the confiscation of their 
goods was ordered by municipalities. However, such measures often triggered an escalation of the 
conflict, which then lasted longer and caused further damage to economic relations. As a result of 
this, individual cities sought alliances with cities which had similar trading interests in order to 
extend the level of protection and increase their capacity to counteract harm. Originally, these 
urban leagues were private organizations set up by the merchants themselves. Depending on the 
flow and extent of urban development, public authorities took over this role and the principalities 
were to become the framework of their organization – as happened in the county of Flanders in the 
course of the thirteenth century.10 The most prominent late example of such a transition is the 
German Hanse, which emerged as an association of merchants and did not become a league of 
cities until 1356, continuing to operate beyond the territories of the relatively weakly developed 
monarchic states in northern Germany.  
Even if the merchants’ interest groups managed to organize themselves at a supra-local 
level, the diversity and fragmentation of urban judicial spheres severely limited their capacity to 
protect their citizens beyond their own walls. The most extraordinary system of regional protection 
that developed in northern France and Flanders in the twelfth century was that of the fairs. These 
were initiated by local authorities trying to attract merchants from abroad by offering them 
protection, not only in the city where the fair was held, but also along their journey. It was the co-
ordination of a calendar of fairs throughout the year in a region protected by a single powerful 
ruler that created huge economies of scale. Fairs held on set dates improved the capacity to plan 
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 transactions in the long term, increased the intensity and speed of information exchange and thus 
considerably reduced transaction costs. The counts of Champagne were the undisputed champions 
of this new regional system of fairs which linked northern and central Italy through northern 
France, including Paris, with the cycles of fairs held in Flanders and southern England.11 The Lille 
fair is the oldest documented event in Flanders, mentioned in 1127. Yearly cycles developed in the 
course of that century and it became possible for merchants to plan journeys travelling from one 
fair to another, and from one region to the next. Increased revenue from local duties, dispute 
settlement and coinage were profitable for the authorities. The merchants appreciated the 
stabilization of the conditions protecting and facilitating their trade, which thus became more 
profitable. 
These regular and predictable meetings brought about the development of international 
trust networks. About 8,000 contracts drawn up at the fairs of Ypres during the second half of the 
thirteenth century have been preserved and reveal regular transactions between merchants from 
Italy, England, Flanders and France. Flemish merchants made agreements in Ypres to finance 
future fairs in the Champagne cycle with partners from England and Italy. This trust network now 
extended to the whole of western Europe, and commercial credit became the foundation of all 
transactions from Italy to England via Champagne and Flanders.12 Trust flourished under the 
protection of the local and regional judicial authorities, but probably even more through the 
sanction of exclusion which could be imposed by the highly profitable trust networks. 
 From the mid thirteenth century onwards, artisans in the most industrialized regions in 
Italy and the Low Countries started to organize themselves, following the model of the merchants’ 
guilds. Cities then reached the peak in their demographic growth and became exclusive. Their 
confraternities, similarly, were embedded in religious ceremonies such as funeral and memorial 
services, the cult of a patron saint via an altar or a chapel, and processions. Charitable care for sick 
and elderly members, as well as for their widows and orphans, was also copied from the 
merchants’ guilds, as were the communal dinners. As the large industrial towns like Arras, Douai, 
Ypres, Ghent and Bruges became increasingly divided by class conflicts, the merchants and 
entrepreneurs who monopolized the city administration strongly opposed the evolution of artisans’ 
confraternities into professional corporations supporting the social and economic interests of a 
particular sector.13 
Class conflicts, friction with other, mutually-exclusive professional groups’ common 
interests and rituals, residence in the same neighbourhood, and incorporation in urban militias as 
a distinct entity behind their own standard – all of these factors served to foster a sense of 
community within the craft guilds. In the cases where they acquired a share in the city’s 
government, such as in Flanders after 1302, relations between the members shifted from mutual 
trust and charitable support vis-à-vis common enemies towards the sheer defence of material 
interests. Some of the largest corporations in the textile sector numbered several thousand 
members, at which point the concept of a trust network can no longer be applied. 14 
Entrepreneurial patterns based on putting-out and subcontracting undermined the alleged 
equality and brotherhood among the guild members. Nevertheless, it has been suggested for Paris 
and other European cities from the late middle ages to the end of the ancien régime that ‘most 
trades were organised around complex networks of informally constituted co-operative 
arrangements involving varying combinations of partnership, patronage, and clientage’.15 
Evidently, the role of the corporative movement was essential in the formation of urban 
communities, especially in those where up to two-thirds of the labourers worked in an export 
industry such as textile manufacturing or beer brewing .The growing complexity of urban society 
was stabilized by its corporative structure; each of its components found its origin in a trust 
network. 
 Most of the craft guilds were labelled initially as religious confraternities celebrating the cult 
of a patron saint and performing charitable works. As such, patrician governments could not 
suppress them, so long as they did not openly act as professional organizations. After the official 
recognition of crafts in Flanders and Liège in 1302, and several decades later in other 
principalities, confraternities continued to flourish as purely devotional associations. Apart from a 
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 single case linked to the Benedictine abbey of Saint Peter, the oldest foundations in Ghent go back 
to the second half of the thirteenth century, and their number increased steadily in the course of 
the following centuries.16 The growing popularity of the Corpus Christi devotion, as well as the 
various qualities of the Virgin Mary and other saints, strongly fostered cults focused on a particular 
altar in a given church. Members would sponsor the cult and participate in the saint’s celebrations, 
including masses and processions. This more emotional and individualized devotion became 
increasingly popular from the fourteenth century onwards.17 Membership lists show that 
prominent personalities, including individuals from princely families, supported such 
confraternities, whose members were mainly recruited in a particular quarter or parish. Their 
socially mixed composition may have counterbalanced the divisions manifest in late medieval 
urban societies as a consequence of the frequent and often violent clashes between patricians and 
craftsmen, between various crafts, or between opposing clans and parties. There can be no doubt 
about the networking function of such organizations.  
 The system of international fairs described above was one of the many contexts in which 
another type of trust network operated, namely, the companies of merchants from cities in 
northern and central Italy. In the mid thirteenth century, they became apparent in contracts under 
the name of a particular family based in a particular city, along with their partners. The Lombards, 
as they were called, appeared in north-western Europe from the thirteenth century and gradually 
became more deeply embedded in local communities. Not only did they develop financial services 
such as money-lending, money-changing and bookkeeping, but in the first half of the fourteenth 
century, they also acquired high offices as receivers or mint-masters for the princes of Brabant and 
Flanders. They took root through intermarriage with local elites and typically operated as family 
networks within various cities and principalities, no doubt to spread the risks which they evidently 
incurred.18 Joint-stock companies grew from family associations into larger organizations 
attracting other investors and agents. They sent their junior partners as representatives in various 
locations, as well as to the major fairs. Given the large scale of the operations and the huge 
investments and risk involved, trust must have been the basis of these commercial companies, 
which extended their network from one Italian city throughout the peninsula, around the 
Mediterranean and into western Europe. Family ties formed the basis of these trust networks, 
while other shareholders and agents were bound by the high professional standards of these 
companies. New accounting techniques such as double entry bookkeeping guaranteed permanent 
control of transactions. Agents abroad had to keep close contact with the headquarters through the 
regular transmission of letters and bills of exchange.19 
 Not all cities and towns were dominated by merchants, nor did craft guilds generally 
participate in politics. These relations obviously depended on local development as an export-
oriented economy of a substantial size. And even in northern and central Italy, where this was 
clearly the case, the balance of power between the merchant class and the aristocracy, living in the 
cities as well as in the countryside, was more complicated. Venice may have been the clearest case 
of a merchants’ republic, but in most land-locked cities the rivalry between popes and emperors, 
from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, dragged the aristocracy into the formation of 
antagonistic clans.20 Their conflicts continued to dominate political culture, even beyond the 
original controversies, as the parties absorbed and reoriented all controversies in the urban 
community towards their own goals. Mutual exclusion from power and banishment of the losers 
from the city perpetuated the tensions and exported them into the countryside. This pattern has 
been described for Italian and Catalan cities as well as for the those of the northern Low 
Countries.21 Fundamentally, parties and clans were based on the loyalty of family bonds. Their 
appearance seems bound to the presence of the aristocracy in cities, which introduced there types 
of power struggle and organization based on clienteles. Their extension brought the inclusion of 
friends and clients whose social status may have been much lower. Parties were rather vertical 
organizations, in which differences of social class were superseded by the sheer struggle for power. 
Divisions typically led to polarization when rival claims to the throne were supported by different 
segments of the aristocracy, whose followers constituted themselves as sworn leagues or parties. In 
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 Friesland, it was the absence of a central authority which left power in the hands of the richer 
peasants, who grouped into parties when external pressure threatened their ‘freedom’.22 
 The final type of network discussed here, that of state officials, mainly recruited citizens as 
experts in the centralization of statecraft. An early case is that of Castile where urban oligarchies 
were dominated by the caballeros, the lower nobility resident in the cities and living off their 
landed properties acquired during the Reconquista. Their military service for the king and counts 
brought them spoils of war. From the twelfth century onwards, they represented the cities in the 
Cortes. Through this accumulation of power, they could restrict the political weight of merchants 
and craftsmen.23 While state personnel had traditionally been recruited from the clergy and the 
aristocracy, from the fourteenth century the growth of central institutions attracted university-
trained lawyers and financial specialists from urban origins. Exposure to the prevailing aristocratic 
values would suggest that burgesses devoted their skills less to urban development than to the 
strengthening of state domination over the cities. On the other hand, states increasingly used their 
supremacy to appoint officials in the cities and gradually extend their powers.24 Recent studies of 
the composition of territorial courts in the Low Countries have revealed the gradual retreat of the 
aristocracy from legal and financial affairs, concentrating their interest instead on the highest 
political, military and representative offices. Lower noblemen, closely intermarried with 
patricians, took over the administration, and remained sensitive to influences from their local 
networks.25 Regular meetings of representatives of the major cities with government officials to 
negotiate fiscal, military, judicial and administrative matters facilitated close contacts, which were 
often accompanied by the exchange of gifts.26 
This was the period, after 1300, which the late Larry Epstein characterized as one of cities’ 
‘institutional inefficiency’, as a consequence of ‘jurisdictional fragmentation’ and the ‘parcellization 
of sovereignty’.27 In my opinion, his interpretation of ‘freedom and growth’ is only correct from the 
viewpoint of public institutions. On that level monarchical states indeed often proved more 
efficient than regional states under urban hegemony – they balanced countervailing powers within 
larger territories. However, one should not overlook the lasting cases of Venice, the United 
Provinces and the Swiss Confederation. Nor should the efficiency of monarchies be overestimated. 
Until the end of the sixteenth century, the complex balances between cities and states left room for 
mutual bargaining and support, as well as for hostilities and increasing state domination. Urban 
elites, seated in the nodes controlling territories, often negotiated private privileges, including 
control of the countryside, in exchange for financial, military and strategic services.28 
 
 
In this article, a number of trust networks have been observed and classified into types. Each of 
them fulfilled particular functions in a specific period of the development of cities. Proximity 
facilitating frequent personal contacts, situations of open competition or even of repeated external 
threats were the most favourable contexts in which to see trust networks actively engaged in social 
change. Some of them lost their functions over time. Merchants’ associations were at some point 
able successfully to civilize their companions, to organize their collective self-defence, to secure 
protection for their members during their journeys as well as privileges from consolidated states, 
and to negotiate with foreign authorities on trade regulations. From the fifteenth century onwards, 
protection, jurisdiction and negotiation about trade relations increasingly became concerns with 
which territorial states claimed to deal. However, private corporations of merchants continued to 
take care of these primordial issues in regions where states were weak, as well as on the maritime 
routes beyond the jurisdiction of any state. One may think of the chartered companies which 
organized most of the colonial trade until the early nineteenth century. Internal pacification and 
the generalization of the rule of law by the sixteenth century led, in most European cities, to the 
extinction of armed conflicts between private gangs or parties who took the law in their own 
hands. However, even today the weakness of state power in southern Italy and eastern Europe still 
gives this phenomenon contemporary relevance.  
In most cases, the local merchants’ guilds had to give up ruling their city exclusively. The 
arbitrariness and abuse of power by their monopolistic governments from the thirteenth century 
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 onwards led to revolts which triggered the intervention of territorial rulers, who then imposed a 
division of power among contending factions.29 From a structural viewpoint, one may also argue 
that cities had simply grown too large and had internally become too diversified to be ruled by a 
merchants’ trust network. Institutions and professionals took over and created a more formalistic 
type of government in which countervailing powers were kept in balance. Cities may still have been 
ruled by oligarchies, but these could no longer function on the basis of trust networks alone. A 
similar argument applies to the craft guilds which, by growing and getting involved in some forms 
of local government, became formal institutions applying rules rather than relying on mutual trust 
between their prominent members. Roberto Michels’s iron law of oligarchization fully applied to 
guilds and crafts. The same can also be said about the trust networks which, in the early stage of 
state building, could act as mediators between cities and states. However, the growth and 
professionalization of state bureaucracies increasingly limited their impact. State officers gradually 
became recruited more on the basis of merit than of friendship and trust. This mechanism equally 
applied to trading companies: the larger they became, the more they had to develop as formal 
institutions applying rules. 
Obviously, these tendencies are far from absolute: even in the present day, trust networks 
play a role, even in large organizations. What we can observe is that various types of trust networks 
were essential in transitional stages, before the formation of new institutions: they fostered a sense 
of community among particular groups in the emerging cities; they helped to create systems to 
protect and regulate regional and international trade; they were at the basis of systems of social 
security and the defence of workers’ rights; they functioned to soften social antagonisms by 
organizing people from different classes around local religious cults; they were at the core of joint-
stock companies operating on an intercontinental scale; and they were intermediaries between 
aristocratic, municipal and state power systems. In all of these situations, trust networks were 
needed to create new activities and social relations. Once these communities became successful 
and grew, they required institutionalization and the trust networks were reduced to possibly 
influential but no longer determining organizations. The originality of the medieval commercial 
trust networks continued to create freedom as well as growth, at least for their privileged 
members. 
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